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THE DUTY TO DECIDE
ALAN W. SCHEFLIN*
N SEPTEMBER 17, 1971, Georgetown University dedicated its new
11-million dollar Law Center facility. In fact, it dedicated it twice
-once inside the building where assembled dignitaries heard an address
by Chief Justice Warren Burger, and once outside in the street where
students and spectators listened to lawyer-activists William Kunstler,
Arthur Kinoy and Catharine Rorabach. But twice dedicated does not
mean twice blessed. And it is surely fitting that a major law school in this
country should, in its opportunity to reflect upon itself, be forced to face
the contradictions which now threaten the integrity and legitimacy of the
law and its processes.
The significance of this extraordinary situation has not been lost on
those officials of our government in whose hands we place the vital
responsibility of operating the vast and ponderous apparatus for the
administration of justice. In a speech recently delivered before the
Oregon State Bar Association,' then Attorney General John Mitchell
opened his talk by observing: "Although largely unnoticed in the press
outside of Washington, one of the vital controversies in American
history reached a dramatic high point three weeks ago in the Nation's
Capital."' 2 The Attorney General (who subsequently left office to man-
age President Nixon's reelection campaign) then attempted to distill the
essence of the "debate" between Chief Justice Warren Burger, on the one
side, and William Kuntsler, on the other. In this brief commentary I
will attempt to show that the "debate," as presented by Mitchell, is
illusory but that there may very well be an alternative approach to the
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1963,
University of Virginia; J.D. 1966, George Washington University; L.L.M. 1967,
Harvard University. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern
California Law Center, 1971-72.
1 Address by Attorney General Mitchell, Not Will But Judgment, delivered before
the Oregon State Bar Association, Oct. 8, 1971 [hereinafter Mitchell].
2 Mitchell 1.
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positions of both sides which would truly
structure an informed and significant set of
opposing viewpoints.
The former Attorney General posed the
crux of the debate, which he described as
"one of the truly basic questions in our gov-
ernmental system," in the following terms:
"Many young people are going into law
because they anticipate using the courts to
effect social change. The question is, there-
fore, is this the best channel that can be
used by the energies working for change?"13
Mitchell concluded that the Chief Justice
would answer this question in the negative
and, although the views of William Kunstler
were never discussed in the remainder of
his speech, presumably Mitchell felt that
Kunstler would respond in the affirmative.
The late Justice Felix Frankfurter
pointed out to us long ago that "answers
are not obtained by putting the wrong ques-
tion and thereby begging the real one."'4
By posing the question the way he did,
Mitchell worked a disservice to both
thinkers. Yet he nevertheless raised an is-
sue that really does need to be discussed.
The presentation of his own views serves
to shed some light on questions of impor-
tance and immediacy. I will first deal with
the former Attorney General's views, then
with the views of Chief Justice Burger
and then with what I consider to be the
"activist" position.
.3 Id. 3.
4 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S.
407, 420 (1947) (dissenting opinion). See Estate
of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413
(1943).
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Not Will, But Judgment
The title for the Attorney General's ad-
dress came from Alexander Hamilton who,
in The Federalist Papers,5 wrote that the
judiciary was "the least dangerous" branch
of government since it had no way of en-
forcing its decrees nor could it take an ac-
tive part in the complicated governing pro-
cess. As Hamilton conceived of the courts,
they "have neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment." Thus, the hallmark of
the proper sphere of a judge's exercise of
discretion is "judicial restraint." This qual-
ity of judicial restraint consists in the re-
fusal of the judge to "substitute will for
judgment"-regardless of whether that will
is "the will of activist attorneys before
the bar, the will of the judges themselves,
or the will of another governmental branch
trying to dominate the Court."0 The alter-
native to judicial caution would be a de-
crease in respect for the courts. "Those
who may be enchanted with the Court as
an instrument of change today would have
opposed its actions yesterday and might
oppose them again tomorrow."7
This is not to say that the courts do not
play a role in social change at all. It is not
necessary for the courts "to remake the
law, young activist attorneys already have
worlds to conquer in using courts to en-
force the law."'8 The courts are not designed
to initiate action but only to respond to the
circumstances which are presented to them.
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 78.
6 Mitchell 4.
7 Id.
8 Id. 6.
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As was pointed out by Judge Craven in
Day v. McDavid:9
It is not one of the emoluments of judi-
cial office that the temporary occupants
thereof can pick and choose the type,
quality or quantity of cases in litigation.
The subject-matter of much present-day
litigation seeking to vindicate personal
rights, promote class action, and to correct
asserted environmental evil seems to be
limited only by the boundless ingenuity of
able lawyers to professionally assert the
rights of their clients.
Anyone who holds the erroneous im-
pression that the law is static need only
examine any trial or reviewing court docket
to be dissuaded of that view.
The heavy flow of social issues into the
court machinery for resolution may have
by-passed expertise at resolution but, as we
noted, the courts are not, nor should they
be, free to pick and choose the issues sub-
mitted for decision.10
Mitchell concluded that the "purpose of
the judiciary is to provide a detached and
impartial judgment of legal problems pre-
sented to the Court, not to effectuate the
peoples' will."'" The judiciary is the only
branch of government which is not directly
accountable to the people (at least on the
federal level and in those states where
judges are appointed and not publicly
elected). Because of the lack of accounta-
bility, judges may be independent but this
independence is purchased at a high cost.
Often the line is quite thin between inde-
pendence and tyranny. Judges who step
"beyond judgment and substitute their will
9 119 Ill. App. 2d 62, 254 N.E.2d 800 (1970).
10 Id. at 63-64, 254 N.E.2d at 801.
11 Mitchell 7.
for the peoples' will" have clearly crossed
over this line.
In essence, the Attorney General was
arguing that, because the judiciary is an
anti-majoritarian institution, it should not
make policy or attempt social change since
it cannot be held accountable to the people
for whom that policy or change is made.
Unlike the other two branches of govern-
ment, the judiciary does not have to face
the voters. As a result, the court is not
directly responsible to the ballot box for
the decisions it reaches. While this secures
a measure of independence, it also does
not allow the people for whom the judiciary
was fashioned to have a direct input into
its decisional process. Because the public
will cannot be brought to bear on the
courts, judges cannot be subjected to the
same type of public control that is exercised
over members of the legislative and the
executive branches of government. The ab-
sence of popular control over decision-
makers is basically anti-democratic because
it is a denial of self-rule. As an anti-demo-
cratic institution, the courts serve a vital
function by providing a check on abuse of
legislative and executive discretion when
that discretion transgresses constitutionally
permissible boundaries. In addition, the
courts provide an appropriate forum for
settling disputes which can be solved by
clarifying the not always lucid law on the
subject. The courts are more efficient and
less ponderous for day to day decision-
making than the other two branches of
government and thus they furnish a suitable
forum for the resolution of individual con-
flicts. 12
12 Good discussions of the limited role that the
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But this is a very limited role. It is, at
most, "interstitial"' 13 legislation with the
heavy emphasis on clarification and not in-
novation. But this is a consequence, accord-
ing to the former Attorney General, of
exercising not will, but judgment.
Law and Social Change
Chief Justice Burger is not a reactionary.
If he were, I suspect that he would find his
job a lot easier. But it is because he accepts
and endorses the inevitable principle of
civilization which requires every viable so-
ciety to perpetually evolve into a higher
order and state of perfection that the Chief
Justice recognizes his unique responsibility
for the way in which social evolution affects
the governing institutions of our constitu-
tional democracy. Thus, in his speech at the
Georgetown Law Center dedication cere-
mony,14 he pointed out that the "basic
question before us in the final third of the
20th century is not whether legal institu-
tions will change, but what those changes
ought to be and how we ought to make
judiciary should play in conflict resolution can
be found in Howard, Adjudication Considered
As a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation
on Separation of Powers, 18 J. Pub. L. 339
(1969); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the
Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3; Fuller, Adjudi-
cation and the Rule of Law, 1960 AM. Soc. INT.
L. PROC. 1.
13 "1 recognize without hesitation that judges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to
molecular motions." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
14 Address by Chief Justice Burger, A Genera-
tion of Change, Georgetown Law Center dedica-
tion, Sept. 17, 1971 [hereinafter Burger].
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them. The duty of disciples of the law is to
preside over orderly change."' 15
But the fact that change is inevitable
does not bring us any closer to describing
what the rate of change should be, what its
scope should be, what the proper method
of change should be and which govern-
mental or other social institutions should
make those changes. These are very impor-
tant questions, especially considering that
the concept of change is inextricably bound
up with personal freedom and liberty. To
the extent that technological and economic
developments affect the rate of change in
society, by necessity the method of change
and the resulting amount of freedom with
reference to that change, will be substan-
tially altered. The following excerpt from
Arthur Koestler's brilliant book "Darkness
At Noon" becomes even more compelling,
if not frightening, when read in conjunc-
tion with recent books like Charles Reich's
"Greening of America" and Alvin Toffler's
"Future Shock," which attempt to evaluate
this society's political and cultural matu-
rity:
We seem to be faced with a pendulum
movement in history, swinging from abso-
lutism to democracy, from democracy back
to absolute dictatorship.
The amount of individual freedom which
a people may conquer and keep, depends
on the degree of its political maturity. The
aforementioned pendulum motion seems to
indicate that the political maturing of the
masses does not follow a continuous rising
curve, as does the growing up of an in-
dividual, but that it is governed by more
complicated laws.
15 Id. 3.
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The maturity of the masses lies in the
capacity to recognize their own interests.
This, however, presupposes a certain under-
standing of the process of production and
distribution of goods. A people's capacity
to govern itself democratically is thus pro-
portionate to the degree of its understand-
ing of the structure and functioning of the
whole social body.
Now, every technical improvement cre-
ates a new complication to the economic
apparatus, causes the appearance of new
factors and combinations, which the masses
cannot penetrate for a time. Every jump of
technical progress leaves the relative intel-
lectual development of the masses a step
behind, and thus causes a fall in the
political-maturity thermometer. It takes
sometimes tens of years, sometimes genera-
tions, for a people's level of understanding
gradually to adapt itself to the changed
state of affairs, until it has recovered the
same capacity for self-government as it
had already possessed at a lower stage of
civilization. Hence the political maturity of
the masses cannot be measured by an
absolute figure, but only relatively, i.e., in
proportion to the stage of civilization at
that moment.
When the level of mass-consciousness
catches up with the objective state of affairs,
there follows inevitably the conquest of
democracy, either peaceably or by force.
Until the next jump of technical civilization
-the discovery of the mechanical loom,
for example-again sets back the masses in
a state of relative immaturity, and renders
possible or even necessary the establish-
ment of some form of absolute leader-
ship.16
Manipulation of change involves awe-
some power. The Chief Justice feels that
power of this magnitude should be wielded
16 A. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 167-68
(1961 ed.).
by only those organs of government which
are directly accountable to the people they
serve:
This [recent significant changes brought
about by litigation] has given rise to the
alluring prospect that our world can be
changed in the courts. I confess it is an
intriguing idea. Federal judges in particular
need not be troubled by constituents or
elections and can therefore concentrate on
problems without regard to public opinion.
Those who would look to judges, and
especially tenured federal judges, to inno-
vate and reshape our society will do well
to ponder what remedy is available if the
world shaped by the judicial process is not
to their liking. I suggest that this approval
be considered against the background of
our traditions and history which began with
a revolution instituted to overthrow a gov-
ernment that was beyond recall by the
votes of the people.' 7
This heritage of popular control over
governmental decision-makers leads the
Chief Justice to conclude that it "was never
contemplated in our system that judges
would make drastic changes by judicial
decisions. That is what the legislative func-
tion and the rule making function is all
about."' 8
There is an additional reason why the
Chief Justice believes that social change
should not be a judicial function. Even if
the courts were accountable to the people,
they still would not have the mechanism
necessary to enforce their decrees. Under
the Constitution, the Executive has the
vested power to enforce the law. The
17 Burger 11-12.
18 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, at 20, col. 1.
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courts, except indirectly in some cases
through the contempt power, are unable to
effectuate their own decrees. Even if judges
wanted to innovate, there is little more they
can do except issue rulings which could
very well go unenforced and unobeyed. 19
In fact, there is substantial evidence to
show that even trial judges often do not
follow Supreme Court commands.2 0 The
inability to issue self-executing decrees, or
to develop a way in which the courts them-
selves can enforce their own decisions,
serves as a restraint on the role of the ju-
diciary according to Chief Justice Burger.
Shortly before his appointment, the Chief
Justice accepted an invitation to participate
in a seminar which I was teaching with two
other colleagues. He had recently decided
the famous case involving Adam Clayton
Powell's censure and denial of seniority by
the House of Representatives. 21 One of the
most forceful items in the whole litigation,
which was a pivotal point of the case for
then Court of Appeals Judge Burger, was
the fact that if the case was decided in
Powell's favor, and Congress then refused
to obey the court, there would be no way
for the court to enforce its decree. 22 Since
19 See Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the
Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State:
A Preliminary Excursus, pts. 1,2 1967 DUKE L.J.
288-94, 522; Miller, On the Need for "Impact
Analysis" of Supreme Court Decisions, 53 GEO.
L.J. 365 (1965).
20 Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme
Court Power, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1017
(1959).
21 Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
22 Burger explained that his perspective on the
case was largely shaped by his belief that there
could be no remedy against Congress. See 395
F.2d 577, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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the court could not compel Congress to re-
verse its decision and make restitution, it
would have been a futile gesture for the
court to decide in favor of Powell.
The Chief Justice's explanation of his
reason for deciding the Powell case the way
he did prompted me to ask him whether
he would have decided Brown v. Board of
Education2 3 against the plaintiffs on the
theory that the court could not compel
obedience to its decision. Justice Burger
responded that Brown was a different case
since it involved a state "rising up in in-
surrection" against the federal government
and former President Eisenhower felt
strongly that federal power must be su-
preme. Eisenhower reportedly communi-
cated to the Supreme Court before its de-
cision his willingness to enforce whatever
order was issued. He kept his word even
though he was unhappy with the Court's
ultimate ruling. The Powell case, on the
other hand, did not involve federal-state
relations but rather the separation of
powers question on the federal level only,
according to Chief Justice Burger. I asked
him whether he had any evidence that Con-
gress would have refused to obey a decision
striking its action against Powell. He re-
sponded that he had no such evidence but
that it would have decreased respect for
the courts to have judicial orders so pub-
licly disobeyed or ignored. I maintained
then, as I do now, that the duty of the
Court was to decide the case on the merits
and take its chances as to Congressional
obedience. In my view, the effect of the
Chief Justice's reasoning is to create a
sovereign above the law, a result that is
23 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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completely antithetical to the rule of law in
our constitutional democracy.2 4
Thus, the Chief Justice's position is that
for strong reasons of the enforcement of
laws and the accountability of lawmakers,
change should not be a product of the ju-
dicial branch of government. The great re-
cent cases which have had strong social
impact, fall into two categories according
to Justice Burger:
The first will be application of long
available constitutional guarantees to exist-
ing situations not previously presented to
the court. The second and larger category
will be the application by courts of specific
statutes, some of recent vintage and some
as old as 100 years or more. Thus, for the
most part it was legislation flowing from
the political process that was the source of
the progress we sometimes credit to
judges.2 5
Thus, even the socially innovative judi-
cial decisions which young activists point
to with pride represent for the Chief Justice
the judicial duty of enfolding in concrete
terms the popular will as expressed through
legislative mandate. In this way, the people
can depend upon the courts to maintain
the important connection between law and
the community.
Activist Advocacy
Although the dedication ceremony at
Georgetown University Law Center was
perceived by the former Attorney General
as a clash between opposing viewpoints rep-
24 See Pound, Disappearance of the Law, 2 Ala.
Law. 363 (1941).
25 Burger 11.
resented by the Chief Justice and William
Kunstler, in actuality there were several
speeches given along with Mr. Kunstler's
and the viewpoints they represent go much
beyond the scope of his own contribution.
Attorney General Mitchell's address did
not deal in depth with Kunstler's speech
nor will my remarks. 26 Rather, I would
like to sketch out in this and the next sec-
tion some of my own observations which I
believe are consistent with what the former
Attorney General refers to as the "activist"
view. In this way I intend to show what I
think the crucial issue facing socially con-
scious young lawyers is in relation to their
perception of, and performance in, our
court structure.
In a speech entitled "The Necessity of
Civility," delivered to the opening session
of the American Law Institute on May 18,
1971, Chief Justice Burger decried the in-
creasing disrespect for courts, judges and
legal institutions. Civility, according to the
Chief Justice, is "an indispensable part-
the lubricant-that keeps our adversary
system functioning. '27 This civility, without
which the trial process is impossible, is
on the decline. As harder, more complex
and more socially fundamental cases are
brought to the courts the adversary system
becomes even more necessary to maintain.
Chief Justice Burger continued:
Yet all too often, overzealous advocates
seem to think that the zeal and effectiveness
26 William Kunstler informs me that there is a
transcript of the counter-dedication speeches, but
I was not able to procure a copy in time.
27 Address by Chief Justice Burger, The Neces-
sity of Civility 13, American Law Institute Open-
ing Session, May 18, 1971.
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of a lawyer depends on how thoroughly he
can disrupt the proceedings or how loud
he can shout or how close he comes to
insulting all those he encounters-includ-
ing the judges.
• ..At the drop of a hat-or less-we
find adrenalin-fueled lawyers cry out that
theirs is a "political trial." This seems to
mean in today's context-at least to some
-that rules of evidence, canons of ethics
and codes of professional conduct-the
necessity for civility-all become irrele-
vant.
28
The Chief Justice then urged law
teachers, who have the first and best op-
portunity to inculcate values in our future
legal generations, to teach that "good man-
ners, disciplined behavior and civility ...
[is] the very glue that keeps an organized
society from flying apart. '29 The speech
concluded with a strong appeal to bar as-
sociations to more rigorously regulate and
discipline the legal profession.
In my opinion, Chief Justice Burger has
in part failed to live up to his own stan-
dards. If he is right about the necessity for
civility, and I believe that he is, then the
very first attribute of such an attitude
should be a willingness to search for causes
and to listen to opposing views-to make
some attempt to understand the other fel-
low's position before criticizing or rejecting
it. Indeed, this is the basic premise of the
adversary system itself. Nowhere in any of
his speeches is any attempt made to under-
stand why this court conduct he disap-
proves of has occurred.30 It is undeniable
28 Id. at 4.
29 Id. at 7.
30 I would like to register a caveat at this point.
Stories of disruption and obstruction, like Mark
18 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1972
that growing numbers of lawyers are be-
coming increasingly more disenchanted
with the legal system and are now less re-
Twain's reported death, are greatly exaggerated.
The most overtly publicized "political" trial with
disruptive overtones was most certainly The
Chicago Conspiracy case and a fair reading of
the transcript will not support the view that the
lawyers intentionally and systematically engaged
in a course of conduct which was designed to
obstruct the trial process. Even the conservative
American Trial Lawyers Association concluded
that the greater responsibility for that shameful
spectacle must be borne by Judge Hoffman:
The system can survive. But it will survive only
if we recognize the difference between abuse
by a judge and comparable, or even greater,
abuse by an accused.
Excesses or misconduct during a trial, when
confined to the defendants or their counsel,
can create serious temporary problems without
permanently endangering our basic system of
justice. If this is all that happens, such defen-
dants will probably go to jail, leaving the
court system relatively unscarred and un-
harmed. Abuse of the power of the state in a
courtroom, or elsewhere-whenever such
abuse is unchallenged or unchecked-may
leave more permanent residuals. At the end
of the trial, the judge, appointed for life, goes
home; but the judicial system has been, per-
haps irreparably, damaged.
• . . We may need to re-examine our pro-
cedures to provide new ones for such trials, but
these changes cannot alter the fundamental
requirement that the umpire not join the
fight.
Editorial, Aftermath of Chicago, TRIAL, April/
May, 1970 at 46.
According to a subsequent editorial entitled
"The Detractors," "A preliminary study spon-
sored by the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, funded by the Ford Foundation,
after querying 1600 judges, reports in-court mis-
behavior by lawyers is insignificant." TRIAL, Sept./
Oct., 1971, at 9. Professor Arthur Sutherland of
the Harvard Law School is presently completing
a history of the American legal profession. He
has reportedly commented:
There has been no recent increase in court-
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luctant to conceal their emotions. 31 This
discontent, in turn, is made public with the
result that there may be a societal decrease
in respect for the judiciary. According to
the Chief Justice, "What the public thinks
... becomes the measure of public confi-
dence in the courts, and that confidence is
indispensable. ''3 2 Yet it is clear that there
is a serious crisis of confidence in the law
and the judiciary which threatens the reign
of the rule of law. It is crucial to under-
stand why this has occurred.
Among both racially and monetarily dis-
enfranchised peoples, the law is something
to be feared. The late Senator Robert F.
Kennedy lucidly observed:
[T]o the poor man, "legal" has become a
synonym for technicalities and obstruction,
not for that which is to be respected. The
poor man looks upon the law as an enemy,
not as a friend. For him the law is always
taking something away. 33
room disruptions by trial lawyers in compari-
son with recent years.
But you've a new breed of lawyers inspired
by Ralph Nader .. . getting in there and
ruffling the hair of a lot of people, insisting on
people getting their rights. I don't believe in
being rude to judges, but I do believe in insist-
ing on people's rights.
TRIAL, Sept./Oct. 1971, at 47.
A great deal of the irresponsible overreaction
to the Chicago trial, with emphasis placed on
court disruption, can be traced to a foolish
article by Louis Nizer. Nizer, What to Do When
the Judge Is Put Up Against the Wall, N.Y.
Times, April 5, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
31 See LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE (R. Lefcourt
ed. 1971); RADICAL LAWYERS (J. Black ed.
1971).
32 Address by Chief Justice Burger, Sept. 10,
1971.
33 Address by Senator Kennedy, University of
Chicago, Law Day, May 1, 1964, cited in P.
WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: at 6 n.13 (1965).
Writing in the N.Y. Times on whether a
Black man can get a fair trial in this coun-
try, Haywood Burns, director of the Na-
tional Conference of Black Lawyers, was
compelled to answer in the negative.34
Although many more examples of dis-
quietude among ethnic minorities could be
brought forth,3 5 the point is not in conten-
tion. What is more significant, at least inso-
far as it affects greater numbers of persons
who have more political power, is the fact
that even those people for whom the legal
system has always been a protector are
now disenchanted with its operation. This
disenchantment stems not merely from the
more highly visible problem of judicial lack
of ethics,36 nor from the increased recog-
nition of the vulnerability of the judiciary
as it has been demonstrated by the Chicago
Seven trial and its progeny, nor from the
Senate debates over the quality of the Nixon
appointments to the Supreme Court, nor
even from this administration's attempt to
weaken the court structure by playing the
"courts are coddling the criminal" game in
the public arena,3 7 but basically from the
34 Burns, Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in
This Country?, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 5.
35 In the words of Judge Murphy: "It's a miracle
they don't burn down the courthouse. All they
see is white people enforcing white laws designed
to do them in." Murphy, D.C. Small Claims
Court-The Forgotten Court, 34 D.C.B.J. 14, 15
(Feb. 1967).
36 As witnessed by Justice Fortas' resignation
from the Supreme Court, Justice Haynesworth's
financial involvement in pending cases, and the
recent discovery of corruption on the Supreme
Court of Illinois and in lower courts in Massa-
chusetts, these are probably not isolated in-
stances though hopefully they are exceptions to
the rule of judicial observances of ethical stan-
dards.
37 A new twist on the old argument has recently
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simple fact that court delays and lawyers'
fees make resort to the judiciary exclusively
a rich man's privilege.
Thus, for large classes of people the ju-
diciary is the object of scorn and obloquy
because it fails to deliver justice or even
impartiality of judgment. For others, the
judiciary is not worth respecting because it
is too slow, too costly and too uncertain of
result. It must be remembered that the
greatest number of people having direct
contact with the courts do so at the lowest
level of the judicial rung. It is in these traf-
fic courts, domestic relations courts, police
courts and courts of general sessions that
the dispensation of justice occurs on a day
to day basis. Just a few hours in these usu-
ally dingy surroundings is bound to weaken
the fortitude of any staunch believer in the
rule of law. 38 In an article appearing in
been suggested by California's Attorney General,
Evelle Younger. In a speech delivered to the
California Conference on the Judiciary, January
13, 1972, Younger expressed the view that the
criminal justice system is on the verge of collapse
and that much reform was necessary to save it.
He denied that he was talking about the "courts
are handcuffing the police" criticism because he
did not share that viewpoint:
I've never joined in the hysterical cry that
recent Supreme Court decisions are responsible
for the alarming rise in crime.
If the criticism must be given a catchy title,
let's call it 'the courts are handcuffing the
courts.' That statement reflects my firm con-
viction that appellate courts in the last 15
years have seriously reduced the effectiveness
of criminal trial courts.
Their obsession with procedural matters has
turned a criminal trial into a game which is
only remotely and incidentally concerned with
guilt or innocence.
L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1972, Part II, at 3, col. 1.
38 Any assessment of an area where the law
has failed as an instrument of justice should
18 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1972
Readers Digest entitled "Only Radical Re-
form Can Save Our Courts," 39 the following
pertinent observations are made:
To be effective, justice must be both fast
and fair. It is the pace of justice that has
become distorted. Some courts, usually the
lower courts that deal with lesser matters in
big cities, race through their case loads on
an assembly-line basis so that the whole
process becomes a farce. Other courts,
especially big-city trial courts, fall years
behind in their calendars. When a citizen
has to wait 21 to 5 years to be awarded
damages, as he does in most large Ameri-
can cities in cases that go before a jury,
the wait itself becomes an injustice.
Earl Warren recently recalled that,
shortly before he left office, felony cases in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York were taking 22
months to get to trial. The accused were
free on bail during the wait. However, said
Warren, "If the defendant were innocent,
think of the cloud over his life, and if he
were guilty, think what he could do to
disrupt society."
Just how badly a court can be run in
1970 immediately strikes even the layman
casually visiting the Manhattan division of
the New York criminal courts. The court
is located in a large, littered building
swarming with bewildered defendants and
their families, bored prostitutes, tired po-
licemen, sullen clerks, disheveled Legal Aid
lawyers and harassed judges. Judge Irving
begin with the courts. . . .The small claims
courts treat the poor man's property like the
police courts, and sometimes the juvenile
courts, treat his soul.
Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for
Law, 1970 DuKE L.J. 425, 426, 428.
39 Main, Only Radical Reform Can Save Our
Courts, READER'S DIGEST, Nov. 1970, at 106
(condensed from FORTUNE) reprinted in CONc.
REC., S. 18218-19 (1970).
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Lang, a 41-year-old former narcotics com-
missioner, rushes from the courtroom into
his robing room and says, "Welcome to the
busiest court in the world." Some 200 to
300 prisoners a day come before him, and
Lang once arraigned 416 persons between
10 a.m. and 5 p.m.-an average of one a
minute. "It's difficult to be dignified in a
situation like this," he says. But the crimi-
nal case load is rising by 20 percent a year
in New York City. 40
The President of the New York Bar As-
sociation, after being shown normal operat-
ing procedures and the quality of justice in
the Criminal Court Building in Manhattan,
said, "I am absolutely shocked by what was
seen. . . . If the public knew about this
they'd never allow it. But the problem is
that it is basically the poor, the minorities,
who have to suffer these indignities, and
their voices are seldom heard."'4 1 These
facts of life of American jurisprudence are
not indigenous to New York City. Chief
Justice Burger himself has pointed out that
"[un the supermarket age we are trying to
operate the courts with crackerbarrel cor-
ner grocer methods and equipment-vin-
tage 1900."42
This is a very bleak picture. And it is
not made any more appealing by judges
arguing, or demanding, that lawyers look
away from these failings. Rather, as Judge
Skelly Wright observed in a seminal article,
"But if the law is to gain respect, it, like
everything else, must earn respect. This it
has not done."'43 A new generation of law-
40 Id. at 106-07.
41 L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1972, at 15.
42 Burger, The State of the Judiciay-1970, 56
A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
43 Wright, THE COURTS HAVE FAILED THE POOR,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
yers simply refuses to close its eyes, like the
Scales of Justice, to the reality of social
conditions and the quality of justice dis-
pensed by the courts.
It is discouraging, if not infuriating, to
see that the judicial response to these ad-
mittedly difficult and troubling problems is
to sweep all criticism of the judiciary under
the rug, parade the courts around as the
Emperor did with his fabled new clothes,
and try to silence all voices raised in oppo-
sition. The case of Martin Erdmann serves
as an example. Erdmann, a lawyer who has
defended thousands of indigent clients over
25 years, expressed his distress over and
frustration with the criminal court system
and the judges who preside over it. In a
March 12, 1971 Life magazine article, Erd-
mann bluntly expressed his view of the poli-
tics and corruption presently existing on the
bench. Though the Life article spent only
a few paragraphs on his views, what Erd-
mann said so outraged the judges of New
York's First Department Appellate Divi-
sion Court that they petitioned the Bar
Association for disciplinary proceedings
against Erdmann on the basis of his com-
ments. The Bar Association refused to so
act. Yet many judges go on trying to cen-
sure lawyers rather than solve the real
problems. Erdmann's case is, unfortu-
nately, only one of an emerging pattern
of judicial repression directed against acti-
vist advocacy. A recent article in the Har-
vard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Re-
view commences with the extraordinary but
accurate comment: "It has become both
professionally and legally dangerous to be
a lawyer representing the poor, minorities,
and the politically unpopular. ' 44 Professor
44 Comment, Controlling Lawyers By Bar As-
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Monroe Freedman of the George Washing-
ton University Law School, himself a victim
of this repression, 45 has recently written
about the deplorable conduct of the Com-
mittee on Admissions and Grievances in
the District of Columbia which, in its zeal
to hastily and summarily censure several
left-wing lawyers, not only failed to obey
its own rules, but actually put aside cases
that had been pending for months including
one complaint against a member of the Bar
who had made a practice of defecating in
the courthouse stairwell. 46 A new tactic
now being employed by some judges is to
refuse to let certain famous activist lawyers
appear in their courts.47 Last year, U.S.
District Court Judge Jesse Curtis refused
to allow Michael Tigar to appear in his
court unless Tigar was willing to swear that
he had not advised his clients in another
case (the Seattle Seven case) to disrupt the
trial. Tigar, at the time a member of the
U.C.L.A. law faculty, refused to answer
the question because it was an unwarranted
interference with the attorney-client privi-
lege. Curtis then said Tigar was "profes-
sionally unfit to appear in my court in this
case." On appeal, Curtis was reversed and
the Supreme Court let stand the appellate
order directing Curtis to allow Tigar to ap-
sociation and Courts, 5 HARv. Civ. RTs.-Crv. Lia.
L. REV. 301 (1970).
45 See Freedman, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, n.1 (1966).
46 Freedman, Threat to Dissent: Repressing the
Lawyer, Civil Liberties, Sept. 1971, at 1, col. 1.
47 See my prediction that this would occur.
Comment, Controlling Lawyers By Bar Associ-
ation and Courts, 5 HARV. Civ. RTs.-CIv. Li. L.
REV. 301, 392 n.450 (1970).
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pear as counsel.48 In another incident, U.S.
District Judge George Templar, this past
January, refused to allow William Kunstler
to appear as counsel for the Gay Liberation
Front, on the grounds that Kunstler is no-
torious and is constantly "deriding the ju-
diciary. '49
It should be clear that the following two
postulates pose the problem: (1) the courts
48 Curtis v. Munoz, 40 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S.
Jan. 24, 1972).
49 L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1972, at 2. The following
account of the incident appears in THE ADVO-
CATE (Los Angeles) (Feb. 1972):
"Well, this court finds you are an out-of-state
attorney and not eligible to practice in Kansas,"
Judge Templar replied, "the court finds that
your attitude towards the courts and judges is
one of utter disdain. I will not let you appear
in this case."
The judge added that he could not close his
eyes to Kunstler's "well-known attitude towards
the judiciary. In the last 30 days, you have
said that the courts are 'vile creatures'."
Kunstler denied having made such a remark,
adding, "You are doing a terrible thing."
"You are famous, notorious," the judge con-
tinued, "for exploiting and arousing antipathy
for the courts all over the country."
"If I have been critical of the courts,"
Kunstler replied, "your action today is an ex-
ample of why I have made such statements.
You have diminished my respect for the
courts."
The judge told Kunstler his ruling was final,
and he could appeal it to a higher court if he
wished.
Kunstler stepped back from the bench and
sat down at the counsel table. Judge Templar
then informed him that only attorneys directly
involved in the case could sit there.
Kunstler responded, "I don't even want to
sit in your courtroom and face you after this
decision."
The lawyer rose, walked to the spectators'
section, and sat down. The judge called a five-
minute recess.
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are in bad shape in terms of internal effi-
ciency and the external appearance of be-
ing able to deliver justice, and (2) those
persons who are best able to see and under-
stand this fact, and perhaps do something
about it, are being silenced by the very
persons whose responsibility it is to correct
these deficiencies. The late Justice Hugo
Black observed: "We sit at the top of a
judicial system accused by some of nearing
the point of collapse."'50 It is not my point
here to blame only the judges, or anyone
else, for the crisis in the administration of
justice which we all must admit now exists.
Ralph Nader has very cogently pointed out
that "possibly the greatest failure of the
law schools-a failure of the faculty-was
not to articulate a theory and practice of a
just deployment of legal manpower." 51 Per-
haps if the law schools had not failed in
this responsibility, we would not be in the
predicament we are in now. But surely it
is in an attempt to redress the imbalance
that a good deal of the present tension can
be traced. Because of the general failure of
the legal profession as an entity to meet its
responsibilities to the poor and the unpop-
ular, there has been created a normal pat-
tern of principles and procedures which ac-
tivist lawyers are now challenging. In other
words, the failure of the Bar to press for
social justice and equality resulted in a lack
of pressure on judges to make law respon-
sive to human needs. Activist lawyers are
now seeking to restore the balance by rep-
resenting those interests which the legal
50 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 429 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
51 Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, THE
NEW REPUBLIC. Oct. 11, 1969, at 21.
profession generally failed to service. For-
mer Chief Justice Earl Warren hit the mark
exactly when he pointed out that
S.. the Bar can and should play a vital part
in bringing the spirit of justice and the
accomplishment of it into every court room
in our land.
In all candor, I cannot say that in my
view the organized Bar of the Nation has,
on the whole, discharged that obligation in
praiseworthy fashion. Throughout the Mc-
Carthy era, and for years following that
shameful period, while the federal courts
were struggling to make the Bill of Rights
and the Civil War Amendments meaningful
in our society, the organized Bar of the
Nation did precious little to assist. On the
contrary, it occupied itself with trying to
establish to the world that the Supreme
Court of the United States was the hand
maiden of Communism and the greatest
friend the Soviets had in America. There
were exceptions, of course, on the part of
some courageous and responsible lawyers,
and some local bar associations including
notably this one. But these were exceptions.
And their voices were muted in the national
councils. I suggest that is not good enough.
It is not good enough for a profession that
prides itself in the role of its members as
officers of the court and defenders of the
Constitution.
This default on the part of the organized
bar has, in my view, produced predictable
consequences. In large measure, because of
the neglect of the Bar, many anachronistic
practices of another day, which degrade
people because of color, are still the vogue
in many jurisdictions. I should like to show
to you that this is so, particularly with
respect to practices that should be of spe-
cial concern to lawyers. I do so because I
believe that, whether these practices exist
in our own communities or not, we should
be concerned with, and can be helpful in,
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eliminating them, root and branch, from all
the courtrooms of America. 52
One premise should be clear: in the
words of Justice Douglas, speaking par-
ticularly about the Supreme Court, though
his words apply to all courts, "This Court
of course does not sit to cure social ills that
beset the country.153 Activist attorneys do
not believe the contrary. But this is not to
say that the court plays no role in effecting
social change. I said at the beginning of this
paper that former Attorney General Mitch-
ell had posed the wrong question in analyz-
ing the disagreement between Chief Justice
Burger and William Kunstler. In viewing
their differences as a disagreement over the
"best channel" to accomplish social change
through law, Mitchell missed the point.
The Chief Justice certainly believes that the
legislature is charged with the responsibility
for social evolution and that the courts
must take their guidance from the legisla-
tive mandate. According to this view, the
legislature is not simply the best channel
for social change; it is the only appropriate
channel.
The activist position does not disagree
with the Burger-Mitchell view that the leg-
islature is best structured to achieve more
meaningful social change. The question is
not, as Mitchell believes, whether the legis-
52 Warren, Unfulfilled Ideals, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS
24, 27-28 (1970). Chief Justice Warren is par-
ticularly concerned in this article with courtroom
procedures and rules which deny fundamental
human rights. The article was adapted from an
address to the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, April 9, 1970.
53 Williams v. Schaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1041
(1967) (denial of cert.) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
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lature is best able to engineer creative social
progress since all sides agree that it is. The
question is rather what is the proper role
and function of the courts when they are
faced with social issues? It is in reference
to this latter question that opposite view-
points emerge and a true debate between
Burger and Kunstler (representing the ac-
tivist position) emerges. And the debate
becomes most important in those areas
where it is clear that the legislature, either
because of disinterest, political pressure,
lack of awareness or governmental defer-
ence has not acted or will not act. The
question then is not whether decisions are
best made by the legislature, but rather
whether decisions are best not made at all.
It is in this context that the Chief Justice,
accepting a passive role for the courts,
would decline to act. Activist advocacy,
however, recognizes a social responsibility
of judges which creates a duty to decide
cases, even though the cases will have
strong social impact.
The Social Responsibility of Judges
The majesty of the law lies in its neu-
trality. The demand for obedience to law,
which is an absolute essential for the exis-
tence of the rule of law, can rest on only
two opposing bases: force or legitimacy. 54
Consequently, there are two techniques for
maintaining a law-obedient society-"one
is to penalize intransigence so severely that
potential law-breakers are deterred by fear.
The other is to foster in them a sense of
'political obligation,' with a view to obtain-
ing their uncoerced obedience and sup-
54 See Scheflin, Jury Nldlification: The Right to
Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 188-89 (1972).
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port." 55 Each technique leads to a different
culture-either a police state or "a society
where law is responsive to human needs."5 6
In order for the courts to play a role in a
society where law is responsive to human
needs, the legitimacy of the judiciary will
have to be maintained. In concrete terms,
this means that the courts must be viewed
by the society as being fair, impartial and
neutral, treating all persons who appear in
the courts equally and without prejudice.
That the courts are not so perceived today
follows from the previous discussion. The
judicial attitude which makes detachment
a virtue is largely to blame for the lack of
fairness in judicial rules and treatment of
persons brought before the bench.
It is the central thesis of this article that
the judicial office carries with it, as part
of the oath of entrance, the requirement
that the judge must be responsible legally,
morally and socially for the decisions he
reaches and cannot hide behind the veil of
neutrality to absolve himself from the social
impact of his rulings. As a corollary, the
lawyer has an obligation, well-recognized
today by the "activist" attorneys, to in-
crease the social consciousness of judges.
That judges have resisted becoming im-
mersed in what Alexander Pekelis has
termed "the travail of society, ' 57 is an un-
derstatement.
The business of deciding other men's
55 Lusky, Minority Rights and tile Public Inter-
est, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1942).
56 W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 92
(1970).
. A. PEKELIS, The Case for a Jurisprudence of
Welfare, in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 1, 40 (M.
Konvitz ed. 1950).
disputes has never been a comfortable one;
those charged with judicial functions have
in all ages sought means of minimizing
their personal responsibility for the decision
rendered. The modern judge is likely to
depict himself as an inert conduit through
which the force of statutes and precedents
is communicated. During periods when a
general belief in witchcraft and magic
exists, another means is open to the judge
for obscuring or eliminating his personal
responsibility for the decision rendered.
This consists in converting the trial into a
ritualistic appeal to the supernatural, in
which the judge acts as a mere umpire to
see that the proper forms are observed and
to announce the decision when it has been
determined. The modes of trial in early
English law which illustrate this conception
are trial by battle, by ordeal, and by oath of
compurgation. It is disputed whether the
conception of procedure, and of the judge's
function, embodied in these modes of trial
is a general characteristic of primitive jus-
tice, or arises only during periods when, for
one reason or another, the judge's position
has become insecure, either toward those
below him or toward the king above him.
Apparently in some cases "supernatural"
modes of trial originally used only in cases
where actual evidence was lacking, were
later extended to all cases. Another point of
obscurity is the extent to which these modes
of trial were manipulated by the judge to
produce the result he considered proper
"on the merits. 58
The process of separating the judge from
his rulings has a dual purpose, as is sug-
gested above. In the first place, the judge is
personally protected from any aspect of
his decision with which he would not like
to be associated. "The law is the law and
my duty is to declare it and not make it"
cis L. FULLER AND R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT
LAW 157 (1964).
HeinOnline  -- 18 Cath. Law. 29 1972
isolates the judge from the law and thereby
removes his own personal involvement in
the decisional process. In this regard, the
judge claims a protection similar to the
lawyer's claim of neutrality-"do not judge
me by my client: my duty as an advocate
is to present a position, even if I disagree
with that position." 59 Since the obligations
of counsel and judge are quite different,
these two claims of neutrality are not iden-
tical. The theory behind both, that the judge
and the lawyer are not personally respon-
sible for their conduct, is, however, the
same. Secondly, it allows the judge to exer-
cise control over the outcome of the trial
without creating the appearance of a loss
of his neutrality.
The duality of court and judge has been
recently argued by J. Edward Thornton
in an article entitled "The Freedom of
Judges."'60 Quoting an early federal case
which stated that "A court is not a judge,
nor a judge a court," 61 Thornton concludes
that a judge never decides a case, only the
court decides cases. Under this view a trial
judge does not rule on questions of evi-
dence. When he says "sustained" or "over-
ruled" it is not the judge's ruling but rather
"it is the ruling of the court presided over
by the judge."'6 2 While there are some im-
portant reasons to adhere to the distinction
between judge and court, 63 this distinction
59 See Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30
U. Prrr. L. REV. 125 (1968).
60 Thornton, The Freedom of Judges, 2 CuM-
BER.-SAM. L. REV. 145, 147-51 (1971).
61 United States v. Clark, 25 F. Cas. 441, 442
(No. 14804) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). See Todd v.
United States, 158 U.S. 278, 284 (1895).
62 Thornton, supra note 60, at 151.
63 See Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Su-
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cannot be used as a basis for arguing that
the judge is not to be held accountable for
the decisions he reaches.
The Burger-Mitchell position advocating
judicial restraint is based primarily on the
undemocratic nature of the judiciary. It is
theorized that the courts are not directly
answerable to the people and should there-
fore not make policy for them. But this
view ignores an important consideration.
The underlying function of the judiciary
requires it to be undemocratic-the courts
must protect the minority against the ma-
jority and protect the majority against it-
self.
The California Supreme Court recently
ruled that the death penalty violated the
California Constitution. Governor Ronald
Reagan angrily commented that "the court
is setting itself up above the people and
their legislature. '0 4 But this is not a valid
criticism of the court because, as an edi-
torial commentator has pointed out, "that
is what courts are for-to restrain the peo-
ple, and legislatures, and even governors
from taking actions that contradict princi-
ples declared in constitutions, which are
the basic legal compacts of the society.
' 6 5
The 6-1 California decision was written
by Chief Justice Donald Wright, the only
member of the court appointed by Reagan.
The court took great pains to emphasize
that its decision was not an act of judicial
usurpation of the legislative function:
preme Court in the Age of the Positive State,
supra note 19.
64 L.A. Times, Feb. 19, 1972, at 1.
65 D.J.R. Bruckner, What Are Courts For, If
Not to Rule on the Constitution?, L.A. Times
Feb. 23, 1972, pt. II, at 7.
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"Our duty to confront and resolve consti-
tutional questions, regardless of their diffi-
culty or magnitude, is at the very core of
our judicial responsibility," the court said.
"It is a mandate of the most imperative
nature."
The court said the cruel or unusual pun-
ishment clause operates to restrain legisla-
tive and executive action and to protect
fundamental individual and minority rights
against encroachment by the majority.
"It is the function of the court to exam-
ine legislative acts in light of such constitu-
tional mandates to ensure that the promise
of the Declaration of Rights is a reality to
the individual," it pointed out.
Were it otherwise, the court added, the
Legislature would ever be the sole judge of
the permissible means and extent of punish-
ment and the constitutional ban would be
"superfluous. " 66
One might criticize the logic of the
court's opinion but not its duty to decide
the case.
Activist lawyers argue that the judiciary
plays a vital role in our governmental
scheme primarily because it is not account-
able to the people. Its job is to see to it
that the society does not deviate from the
basic principles upon which it was founded.
In our society, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Constitution furnish the writ-
ten record of our commitment as a people
to principles of human dignity and liberty
developed over centuries as necessary for
our self-preservation and individual integ-
66 L.A. Times, Feb. 19, 1972, pt. I, at 24. Los
Angeles Chief of Police Edward M. Davis, a
rity.67 We have placed into the hands of
our judges the primary duty to protect us
from our own transgressions and to further
those social commitments we made when
the ground rules for our existence as a
nation were devised. Judges are faced with
a dual responsibility: they must protect the
minority from encroachment by the major-
ity and they must protect the majority from
deviating from the great goals which serve
as the cornerstones of our Republic. This
first responsibility was well-articulated by
the late Justice Black: "Under our consti-
tutional system, courts stand against any
winds that blow, as a refuge for those who
might otherwise suffer because they are
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because
they are non-conforming victims of preju-
dice and public excitement." 68 The second
highly outspoken critic of the courts in the crim-
inal justice area, made the following evaluation
of the court's decision:
"This action by the 'San Francisco Court,'"
said the chief in his statement, "showed a total
disregard for the innocent victims of homicide
and welfare of not only policemen and prison
guards but also of the average citizen who
frequently finds himself barricaded in his own
home because of the realistic fear of criminal
violence.
"Murderers sentenced to life imprisonment
are eligible for parole, back on the streets, after
seven years," he said. "The decision of the 'San
Francisco Court' is bound to result in the
slaughter of many California citizens by an
army of murderers who have been waiting for
years in Death Row for such an unrealistic
judicial judgment."
L.A. Times, Feb. 19, 1972, pt. I, at 26.
67 See E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACK-
GROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1955).
68 Quoted in an editorial, Hugo Black Re-
tires . . . , L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1971, pt. II, at
6, col. 1. The quote is from an "early" opinion
which was not identified. I have not been able to
track it down.
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responsibility was well recognized by Dis-
trict Court Judge George B. Harris when he
was asked to rule on the constitutionality
of the use of "strip cells" in California
prisons:
Usually the administrative responsibility
of correctional institutions rests peculiarly
within the province of the officials them-
selves, without attempted intrusion or inter-
vention on the part of the courts ...
However, when, as it appears in the case
at bar, the responsible prison authorities in
the use of the strip cells have abandoned
elemental concepts of decency by permit-
ting conditions to prevail of a shocking and
debased nature, then the courts must inter-
vene-and intervene promptly-to restore
the primal rules of a civilized community
in accord with the mandate of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 69
The necessary first step for any judge to
implement these judicial responsibilities is
to familiarize himself fully with the totality
of his role. Too often judges simply turn
their backs to the social conditions that led
people to appear in court and the social
implications of court rulings as they affect
the lives of the people of the community. A
case in point is Judge Charles Halleck of
the Superior Court of the District of Co-
lumbia.70 Judge Halleck was a prosecutor,
naval officer, member of the staff of the
Senate Internal Security Committee and
son of a conservative Congressman. When
he was appointed to the bench he openly
expressed antipathy for youths with long
hair and for activist attorneys. He fre-
69 Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680
(N.D. Calif. 1966).
70 See Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1970, at Al,
col. 1.
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quently gave longer jail terms than most
of his colleagues and often spoke of "crim-
inal anarchy" in the District of Columbia.
Then he began to spend time with the peo-
ple he was sentencing and with the lawyers
he was scolding. He voluntarily spent sev-
eral nights at various penal facilities in the
area to get a first hand look at the effect of
what he was doing when he sentenced crim-
inal offenders. The consequences of "getting
to see the other side" has dramatically
changed him and he is now more sensitive
to the needs and social pressures affecting
the persons who appear before him. In
short, he has come to have a deeper and
more fundamental understanding of his
role. By informing himself more fully of
the larger dimensions of his job, he is now
prepared to bring greater judgment, com-
passion and feeling to his duties. Nor is he
unique.71 Where judicial attention is paid
to the social matrix within which the judge
operates, greater judicial responsibility and
better decision-making is likely to result.72
Judge Donald Lay of the Eighth Circuit
recently pointed this out in the area of
prison reform:
Obviously the sweeping reforms neces-
sary to enable our penal institutions to
achieve their correctional aims cannot all be
accomplished by judicial fiat. But a more
active interest in and need for the judiciary
to find new and more effective means of
bringing about these changes are gradually
becoming more evident.
There will be some who will be alarmed
71 See R. Hammer, Role Playing: A Judge Is
a Con, A Con Is a Judge, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1969, § 6 (magazine), at -.
72 See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1970, at 1,
col. 1. This article is about Federal District
Court Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli.
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by this role of the judiciary decrying it as
"social activism" or as serving to "open new
floodgates" to further burden the judiciary.
Such criticism ignores one of the funda-
mental roles intended for the judiciary in
administering the criminal law. To say
that the judge has no experience or training
to effectively implement this policy is to
ignore his judgmental responsibility under
the law itself. Whether a man is to be
sentenced for one year or ten years,
whether he should be placed on probation
or not depends on the court's judgment of
factors relating to his rehabilitative ad-
justment.
This role of the judiciary does portend a
new age of judicial concern instigated by
the recognition that a large segment of our
society has been needlessly neglected be-
hind prison walls. Our system of criminal
justice, while it demands punishment of
the offender, seeks his correction as well.
The responsibility to individualize this de-
sired end must be borne by the judiciary.
In deference to the inaction of others we
have ignored our responsibility too long.
73
It is the function of the activist attorney
to bring social issues to the forefront in
litigation. This role recognizes the impor-
tance of the technique that began with the
so-called Brandeis Brief.7 4 It is in this way
73 Lay, A Judicial Mandate, TRIAL, Nov./Dec.
1971, at 14, 18. Compare Clements and Fergu-
son, Judicial Responsibility for Prisoners: The
Process That Is Due, 4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 47
(1970): "It is the thesis of this article that,
since it is the courts who consign persons to
prisons and jails, they should also assume pri-
mary responsibility for the consequences of such
confinement." Id.
74 Louis Brandeis, acting as counsel for the state
in Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), filed
a brief with extensive social science information
to justify the legislative wisdom of a statute he
was defending.
that the attorney can hope to prevent the
judge from avoiding his duty to decide.
The argument I am making for judicial
responsibility has often been recognized by
the courts. But it has not been consistently
adhered to nor has it been forcefully argued
by counsel. It is called the "judicial integ-
rity doctrine" and it has its contemporary
origin in the criminal law area in the oft-
quoted dissent of Justice Brandeis to Olm-
stead v. United States:
Decency, security, and liberty alike de-
mand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that
are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government
will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously. Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example. Crime is contagious. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administra-
tion of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution. Against that per-
nicious doctrine this Court should reso-
lutely set its face.7 5
The government cannot be allowed to be
a law-violator and at the same time demand
obedience to law. Nor can the government
be a law-violator and at the same time ask
the courts to sanction the violation. As
Justice Frankfurter observed for the Court
in McNabb v. United States:
Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence
75 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
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secured through such a flagrant disregard of
the procedure which Congress has com-
manded cannot be allowed to stand without
making the courts themselves accomplices
in wilful disobedience of law.
• . . We are not concerned with law en-
forcement practices except in so far as
courts themselves become instruments of
law enforcement. We hold only that a
decent regard for the duty of courts as
agencies of justice and custodians of liberty
forbids that men should be convicted upon
evidence secured under the circumstances
revealed here. 76
It is a judicial cop-out for the judge to
defer decision-making on the grounds that
the legislature is better equipped to reach
more secure conclusions. Obviously there
are certain cases that are beyond the pur-
view of the courts because of the separation
of powers doctrine and other concepts of
judicial restraint (standing, mootness, po-
litical question doctrines, etc.). Broadly
speaking, deference to the legislative will is
most justifiable when questions of distribu-
tive justice, as opposed to corrective justice,
are pressed upon the courts.
But the judicial decision to abstain from
social decision-making is determined by
the temper of the times as well as by legal
doctrine. And judges must be sensitive to
the times. In the words of Justice Douglas:
The fact that we are in a period of
history when enormous extrajudicial sanc-
tions are imposed on those who assert their
First Amendment rights in unpopular
causes emphasizes the wisdom of Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479. There we
recognized that in times of repression,
76 318 U.S. 332, 345, 347 (1943).
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when interests with powerful spokesmen
generate symbolic pogroms against noncon-
formists, the federal judiciary, charged by
Congress with special vigilance for protec-
tion of civil rights, has special responsibili-
ties to prevent an erosion of the individual's
constitutional rights.77
It is usually during those periods of time
when the most pressure is put on the courts
to refrain from acting that the need for
judicial protection is most necessary. Those
who would silence the courts do so to si-
lence the people. It is in such times that
"all that is necessary for the triumph of
evil is that good men do nothing." It is not
necessary to argue that judges should
change society. We can accept Thoreau's
argument that we are not placed on earth to
make this a better world, but we are placed
here not to be the cause of injustice to
another.78 In other words, for judges who
do not believe that courts should take an
affirmative role in social progress, we may
still demand of them that they do not,
through inaction, become the cause of, or
contribute to, the law used in a dehumaniz-
ing way. For judges who feel that even this
goes too far, I would respond with Justice
Frankfurter that the "timid judge, like a
biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless
judge." 79 Thus, I applaud Judge Israel
Augustine of New Orleans who said that
unless the local jails ceased being "medieval
and archaic" he would resign rather than
send prisoners to them.80 And I applaud
77 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971)
(dissenting opinion).
78 THOREAU, CIViL DISOBEDIENCE (1849).
79 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65
(1949) (concurring opinion).
80 Quoted in Bagdikian, The Drive for Inmates'
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THE DUTY TO DECIDE
activist advocacy which brings home to the
judiciary the social dimensions of the pro-
cesses of law.
Ultimately, the dispute referred to by
former Attorney General Mitchell is about
expectations. Chief Justice Burger's posi-
tion is forthright. In an interview last year
with Fred Graham of the New York Times,
Chief Justice Burger was asked whether he
thought that the large enrollment increase
in law schools (attributed to students feel-
ing inspired to use the courts as a method
of accomplishing change in the system
through law) would result in disappoint-
ment of the hopes of students. He re-
sponded:
I am beginning to have an uneasy feeling
that this may be another one of the situa-
tions in this era that we are living in of
creating expectations that are beyond ful-
fillment.
Young people who decide to go into the
law primarily on the theory that they can
change the world by litigation in the courts,
I think, may be in for some disappoint-
ments. It is not the right way to make the
decision to go into the law, and that is not
the route by which basic changes in the
country like ours should be made. That is a
legislative and policy process, part of the
political process. And there is a very
limited role for courts in this respect. But
if they see that as lawyers they may exert
great influence on the whole system, then
they may not be disappointed. 81
I see a different set of expectations. I
see the expectation that government, taken
individually as well as collectively, will de-
Rights, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. S. 2038
(daily ed.) Feb. 17, 1972.
81 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, at 20, col. 6.
liver on the promise of the Bill of Rights
and on the promise of the Constitution. I
am waiting for the carved marble words
over the entrance to the Supreme Court
"EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW" to
become a social reality. I am waiting for
the courts to recognize that that motto ap-
plies to them. I am waiting for the courts
to recognize that Equal Justice Under Law
is a mandate-an affirmative obligation on
the judiciary. As Chief Justice Earl Warren
has noted:
It is not enough merely to open the
courthouse doors to everyone. The pro-
ceedings therein must also be open on equal
terms to all who enter; otherwise the word
'justice' is a sterile one which cannot
command the respect we claim for it.82
The actualization of this ideal requires
an activist role for the judiciary-if by ac-
tivist we mean a perception of., and sensi-
tivity to, the unequal distribution of wealth,
power, liberty, justice and freedom in our
society. I am not asking the courts to re-
make society. That is obviously not their
job, nor is it in the realm of their capacity.
Rather, I am asking for a more limited kind
of activism-the refusal to be complicitous
in the use of the law to perpetuate injustice.
I am asking for the fulfillment of the expec-
tations that grow from our commitment to
the Bill of Rights and a just society under
law. In an address to French attorneys visit-
ing this country under the auspices of the
Department of Justice, Professor Monroe
Freedman spoke very movingly of these
expectations:
82 Warren, Unfulfilled Ideals, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS
24, 35 (1970).
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At home and at school our students were
taught that this is a land of equal oppor-
tunity, but they looked around them and
found that many lead lives of discrimina-
tion and despair. They were taught that
this is a land of material wealth and social
progress, but they looked around them and
found that a very substantial part of the
population was hungry and living in intoler-
able circumstances. They were also taught
to fight clean and to fight for the right,
expressed at Nuremburg as avoiding com-
mission of crimes against peace, crimes of
war, and crimes against humanity, but they
came to see in Vietnam a war in which we
are committing the crimes against peace,
the war crimes, and the crimes against
humanity. As one young man said to me,
it is like watching World War II all over
again, except that this time we get to be the
Nazis.81
I do not believe that fairness and neu-
trality means blindness and detachment.
What is just depends upon what is fair.
What is fair depends upon what is. The
judiciary cannot turn their eyes away from
what is, decide cases on the basis of what
was, and say that the will of the law has
been done. Recognizing, as we all must,
that the brunt of legal reform and social
change cannot be placed in the halls of
justice, we can nevertheless demand of our
judges that they closely heed the closing
words of Chief Justice Burger's address at
Georgetown:
83 Freedman, The Litigating Attorney and So-
cial Reform 7. This speech is reprinted in slightly
altered form in GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVER-
SITY MAGAZINE, Spring 1970, at 21.
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My charge to you as you begin a new
era in your history ...in this magnificent
structure and as you enter a generation of
change is to keep your ideals and your
processes of legal education geared to the
substance of life in the terms of Holmes
who urged that we take part in the action
and passion of our times or have it be
judged that we have not lived.8s
Activist advocacy requires that the lawyer
view his role in the judicial system as a
catalyst for social betterment. The lawyer
must continually prod the judge to open
his eyes to social conditions and to see to
it that his court does not become a conduit
for the continuation of legal injustice. Acti-
vist advocacy requires that the judge be
confronted with his own complicity and not
be allowed to deny responsibility for his
failure or refusal to advance the cause of
social evolution. In short, the activist advo-
cate is charged with the responsibility of
helping the judge make the law responsive
to human needs.
Chief Justice Burger said of law students
that they "need to learn the antiseptic smell
of the jail and the less than antiseptic smell
of the slums." 5 Apart from his being wrong
about the "antiseptic" smell of the jails, is
it expecting too much to ask that those into
whose hands we place the responsibility of
deciding the fate of men learn the same?
84 Burger 16.
85 Id. 14.
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